Theoretical Biology and Philosophy of Science

I work on the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the biological sciences, with particular emphasis on evolutionary theory and systematics. These interests come together in the work I’ve done on systematics, clade selection, the distinction between natives and non-natives in ecology, and on multilevel selection and the evolution of cooperative behavior in social hymenopterans. In each case the central question is Maynard Smith’s: What are the relevant entities?

While evolutionary theory, systematics, and ecology are very different fields, my interest in them is tied together by noticing that advancing in each depends importantly upon conceptual clarity about the objects under study: When, if ever, is a colony of honey bees a single unit from the perspective of natural selection? What kinds and how much cohesion is necessary for interacting individuals to be rightly regarded as a single entity, species, or unit of selection? Does the category 'native' capture anything objective about the biological world?

In philosophy of science proper, I have written on the related subjects of laws of biology and what does (and doesn’t) make biology unique among the sciences. I am also working on theoretical models in population genetics and climate science as a means of understanding how models inform and explain empirical results and public policy.

Some Recent Work

Chew, M. and Hamilton, A. (forthcoming) "Nativeness Considered." In Fifty Years of Invasion Ecology. D. Richardson, ed.  Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
 

Hamilton, A. 2009. "Toward a Mechanistic Evo Devo." In Form and Function in Developmental Evolution. M. Laubichler and J. Maienschein, eds. Cambridge University Press.

Hamilton, A.  2009.  "Letter to Linnaeus."  In Letters to Linnaeus.  S. Knapp and Q. Wheeler, eds.  Linnean Society of London. 

Hamilton, A., Smith, N., and Haber, M. 2009. “Social Insects and the Individuality Thesis: Cohesion and the Colony as a Selectable Individual.” In Organization of Insect Societies: From Genome to Sociocomplexity. J. Gadau and J. Fewell, eds. Harvard University Press, 572-589.

Hamilton, A. and Wheeler, Q. D. 2008. "Taxonomy and Why History of Science Matters for Science: A Case Study." Isis, 99:331-340.

Bechtel, W. and Hamilton, A. 2007. "Natural, Behavioral, Social Sciences and the Humanities: Reductionism and the Unity of the Sciences." In General Philosophy of Science: Focal Issues. Theo Kuipers, ed. North Holland Press, 377-430.

Elser, J and Hamilton, A. 2007. "Stoichiometry and the New Biology: The Future Is Now." PLoS Biology, 5: 181-183.  (Also appears in Estonian as Elser, J. and Hamilton, A. 2008. "Stöhhiomeetria ja uus bioloogia." Akadeemia, 7: 1505-1516.  Translated by Tõlkinud Kalle Hein.)

Hamilton, A. 2007. "Laws of Biology, Laws of Nature: Problems and (Dis)solutions." Philosophy Compass, 2: 592–610.

Hamilton, A. 2006. Review of Ernst Mayr's What Makes Biology Unique? Philosophy of Science, 73: 255-257.

Hamilton, A and Haber, M. 2006. "Clades are Reproducers" Biological Theory, 1: 381-391.

Haber, M. and Hamilton, A. 2005. "Coherence, Consistency, and Cohesion: Clade Selection in Okasha and Beyond." Philosophy of Science, 72: 1026–1040.

In Progress

"What Does It Mean When Models Agree?: Robustness and Independence In General Circulation Models" with Ryan Meyer and Zach Pirtle

Patterns In Nature: Historical and Conceptual Perspectives on Contemporary Systematics (under contract, University of California Press)